A Cuban Solution to the Cuban Problem

Position Paper of the O/A Cuban "Authentic" Organization

Summary
The Ominous Platt Amendment
The 1930 Generation and "The Mediation"
Dictatorship and the 1940 Constitution
The Authentic Revolutionary Party in Power
The March 10 Coup D'Etat (1952)
Failure of Old Formulas
The O/A Position
A Possible Solution
Our Rationale
Our Final Plea

 

The fate of the Island of Cuba, the last colony in our western hemisphere to break away from Spanish "imperial yoke", has been awkwardly bound to the expansion policies of the United States of America, its powerful northern neighbor.

The questionable results of such a tight and at times confusing interrelation - albeit generic benefits for the development of the Cuban state and government - have made Cuba's national integration rather difficult and have interposed obstacles to the political progress of the country.

Today, nearly a century after the end of the Spanish-Cuban-American War (1895-1898), the Cuban people find themselves at a frightful turning point in history. Extraneous powerful forces, like ghosts emerging from the past, are striving again to make Cuba's future conform into a preconceived mold, even though previous failures of such an intervention policy have delayed and disfigured the growth of democracy on the Island.

Our O/A ("Authentic Organization"), as a branch of the Cuban "Authentic" Revolutionary Party, played a historic role in the progressive movement launched by the young Cuban generation of 1930. This movement actually succeeded in the transforming a military mutiny of non-comissioned officers and privates into a genuine socio-political revolution with Dr. Ramón Grau San Martin as head of State (1933-1934). Today, after well over half a century, the O/A considers it a duty to define, precisely and categorically, the scope of its goals in the present struggle against Fidel Castro's tyranny.

As a preliminary clarification, however, we will identify four decisive historical stages unilaterally imposed by the United States on past Cuban-American relations, the result of which was harmful to Cuba by causing widespread suspicion and distrust among its citizenry.

The Ominous Platt Amendment

First: In 1897, with its treasury practically depleted, the Spanish government was hardly able to further sustain an overseas war in Cuba that was ruining its economy, decimating its army, and breeding political discord back in the Mother Country. In a desperate effort to bring the Cuban rebels under control, the ad-hoc Spanish Governor of Cuba (1896), General Valeriano Weyler, decreed a mandatory "reconcentration" of Cuban peasant families into urban areas all along the Island. His order had an apocalyptic sequel of starvation, wretchedness, epidemics, and death, involving 200,000 victims, but this did not break down the stubborn will of the Cuban patriots to fight for their country. The Cuban answer to Weyler's inhumanity came promptly as the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Army, General Maximo Gomez, issued orders aimed at launching a totally devastating war against Spanish rule, including the destruction of dwellings and plantations, plus the burning of sugar cane fields, sugar mills, and industrial equipment.

Meantime, the United States, interested in the purchase of Cuba since 1805 but turned down by Spain (Ostend Manifesto, 1854), yielded to the pressure of the American public opinion and decided to take part in the Spanish-Cuban War on the side of Cuban insurgents. The Federal Government then proceeded immediately to define its purpose through a Congress Joint Resolution that President William McKinley signed on April 20, 1898.

Before the Joint Resolution was issued, anticipating a possible action by the United States, the Spanish Colonial Government in Habana hastened to proclaim a suspension of all military operations throughout the Island. This was a clever strategem that the Cuban Council of Government in Arms, presided by Bartolome Maso-Marquez, rejected in its Manifesto of Sebastopol (Camaguey Province, April 24, 1898). The council announced the one-sided arbitrary decision of the Spanish authorities in Habana would not be honored by the Cuban freedom fighters.

The landing of American troops at Daiquiri, a beachhead prepared by the Cuban rebels near Santiago de Cuba, took place on June 23, 1898. A week later, on July 1st, Cuban and American troops attacked the rim of Spanish fortresses around Santiago. As a result of Cuban-American joint military operations, the Spanish Army and Navy were defeated barely six months after the entry of the United States in the Cuban Independence War. Yet that was not the end.

To the surprise of the Cubans, the Spanish crown subsequently managed to negotiate advantageous peace terms with Washington D.C. Such terms did not include, as expected the immediate liberation of Cuba from Spanish control. Instead, the Island was temporarily transferred to the American government as Spain relinquished the rest of her colonial empire - Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam to the United States. The settlement was formalized through the signing of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States on December 10, 1898.

The "memorable" Treaty of Paris reassured Spain of American protection for the peaceful withdrawal of all of its troops from Cuba as the preservation of Spanish financial interests there. Throughout this time the Cuban patriots had been left out of both the negotiations and the signing of the treaty, while the United States troops immediately took over the occupation of the Island.

Despite previous American pledges to guarantee right to freedom, independence and sovereignty (Joint Resolution of 1898), the United States government forced upon the Cubans an extraneous piece of legislation called the Platt Amendment to which the Cuban government had to submit after a long, exasperating waiting period. The new terms imposed by the United States on Cuba meant a defeat for the Cuban patriots rather than a triumph. Actually, the Platt Amendment was evidence that although the Cuban patriots had won their Independence War with the aid of the United States, the unilateral decision of their powerful northern ally had compelled them to compromise their political future and, therefore to lose the peace.

Judicious arguments brought forth by the Council of Government of the Republic of Cuba in Arms against such outrageous American impositions were repeatedly ignored. In fact, the only option left for the Cubans was to choose between an indefinite American military occupation of their island or their acceptance of the Platt Amendment. The Amendment was "thus forced down Cuba's throat".

The 1930 Generation and the "Mediation"

Second: Just four years after the inauguration of the new republic, with President Tomas Estrada-Palma's term nearing its end, the United States exercised its "right" of intervention in Cuba according to the American Platt Amendment. This event had a demoralizing impact on Cuba's national spirit. It also cast dark shadows on the horizon of the Island's future and aroused serious doubts as to the validity of a Constitutional amendment imposed from outside. In fact, Cuban independence was at stake. In the eyes of the world, it appeared that the painful Cuban struggle for freedom had ended in a humiliating semi-colonial status.

After this second United States intervention (1906-1908), once the American troops had left, the revived Republic, under a new Cuban government, would again be confronted with American interference. The Cubans were doomed to a prolonged submission to the ominous Platt Amendment for another quarter of a century.

A growing feeling of nationalism among the younger generation had emerged after the Independence War, but it had also revived doubts and reservations about Cuba's freedom, already harbored by the old war veterans. The young Cubans now stood up resolutely to President Gerardo Machado's attempts to extend his term in office, and their vigorous demonstrations gradually spread their sentiment throughout the entire country, engaging the support of all social classes. Cuban politics was once more in trouble because of a bold dictator, and the United States would attempt another intervention, this time through diplomatic channels.

At his presidential inauguration in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt had announced his unprecedented "Good Neighbor Policy" directed at Latin America, and the new American President focused his concern on the violent Cuban crisis and on finding solutions different from those applied in the past. Yet, looking back and inspired by the spirit of the Platt Amendment, President Roosevelt decided to send his Undersecretary of State, Benjamin Sumner Welles, to Cuba.

Even though this presidential envoy's intercession, known historically as "The Mediation", contributed to Machado's downfall, his insidious diplomatic strategies stirred up further divisions among the young nationalists. In an early restless country, Mr. Welles scheme exacerbated tensions by imposing his own handpicked new President, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, who lasted only 27 days in office. Moreover, Mr. Welles imposition sparked a rebellion among the Cuban military non-commissioned officers and privates that the University Student Directorate and it allies successfully managed to convert into the genuine nationalist revolution of 1933. This spontaneous revolutionary movement entrusted the country's leadership to Dr. Ramón Grau San Martin as President pro tempore. His provisional mandate, later known as the "100-day Administration" or "Revolutionary Government", immediately denounced the American Platt Amendment, and introduced economic, political and social resolutions inspired by the ideal of transforming Cuba into a real democracy (1933-1934).

On January 2, 1934, Grau's revolutionary administration convened an election of delegates to a Constitutional Convention and scheduled its sessions to begin three months later, on April 22, 1934. This drastic step was designed to set a new course for Cuba's troubled history; however, such a democracy bound turn of events alerted Jefferson Caffery, then American ambassador to Habana, to counteract the new government's decision.

After consulting with Washington D.C., Ambassador Caffery approached Colonel Fulgencio Batista - former Cuban Army sergeant - to induce him to assume the leadership of another military rebellion. This one would strike against Grau-San Martin's administration and thus abort the effective development of Cuba's independence, already underway.

Dictatorship and the 1940 Constitution

Third: It was obviously through American patronage that a new long period of extraneous interference began with Batista's military control of the Cuban government. The rough decade that followed (1933-1944) was marked by Batista's violent arbitrary measures to tyrannize his people through repression persecution, torture, assassination for political motives, election fraud, and even the dismissal of a duly elected chief of state.

Dr. Miguel Mariano Gomez-Arias, who won the election for President (1936-1940) had plainly refused to submit to an undisciplined soldiery and had opposed the introduction of gangsterism in Cuba's political life. He had, besides, kept himself clean at a time when administrative corruption was rampant as never seen before in Cuba. In Batista's narrow view, President Gomez-Arias had committed a "mortal sin" by exercising the presidential veto over a new tax bill intended for the militarization of certain public schools. Instead of overriding the President's veto through the required two-thirds vote in Congress, a legislature submissive to Batista decided to impeach the President and remove him from office.

From the very beginning of that tragic decade (1934-1944), Batista had managed to impose his military dictatorship on the Cuban people, either directly or through puppet executives, lobbyists, and legislators officially recognized by the Washington D.C. and patronized by the United States embassy. Throughout that time, the O/A, as the working tool for the democratic "Authentic" Revolutionary Party and for its allies, proceeded with ample popular support to denounce and fight the outrages of the military.

As time passed, the Cuban people's resistance to military oppression and brutality, the threat of Nazi-Fascism in Europe, and the outbreak of World War II forced Batista to direct his strategies towards a democratic political openness. His new approach was to convene a Constitutional Convention in 1940, at which the Cuban "Authentic" Revolutionary Party proved to be the strongest voice for the majority.

Once the 1940 Constitution was promulgated and general elections were held, although still under pressure from the military, the Cuban people elected Batista as President (1940-1944), something he had sought for himself through the years. Ironically, however, during his presidential term, and despite his total control of congress, Batista did not lift one finger to introduce improvements in his corrupt administration (1940-1944) nor did he comply with constitutional mandates for the promotion of basic supplementary legislation. The 1940 election was the only democratic process through which Batista ever reached the presidency. Yet arrogated to himself indiscriminate congressional functions, wielded again his own personal power over the other branches of government, and flouted the provisions of the 1940 Constitution that he himself had supported. Obviously, the lack of a check-and-balance system of government had thrown Cuba once more into the hands of a tyrant.

The "Authentic" Revolutionary Party in Power

Fourth: In 1944, near the end of Batista's only presidential term, there was strong public pressure for a change towards democracy. Fortunately, this pressure averted the possibility of electoral fraud. Free elections resulted in a victory for Dr. Ramón Grau-San Martin as the candidate of the "Authentic" - Republican Alliance for President (1944-1948).

Committed to a final demilitarization of the country and to compliance with the 1940 Constitution, the new administration had to face conspiracies and incessant hindrances orchestrated by an unsatisfied, seditious sector, and endorsed by a press that pandered to anti-Cuban interests. Despite these persistent obstacles imposed by the enemies of democracy and social justice for Cuba, President Grau-San Martin was able to carry out important tasks for the good of the people, pursuing and achieving a degree of national prosperity and progress that reached all levels of the Cuban populace.

President Grau-San Martin's domestic reforms were as important as his foreign policy, always aiming at a reaffirmation of sovereignty and independence of Cuba as a nation. At the founding conference of the United Nations organization (UNO) in San Francisco (1945), the Cuban delegation opposed the privileged veto reserved for the Big Five. Later in the same year, at a conference held in Chapultepec, Mexico, the Cuban delegates submitted a context for the Declaration of Human Rights with the request that it would be added to the United Nations Charter. The United Nations, in fact, did incorporate this Declaration into its Constitutional Charter on December 10, 1948.

In April of 1948, once more at the proposal of the Cuban delegation, the VIII Pan American Conference (Bogotá) agreed to accept the Grau doctrine opposing economic aggression and favoring decent wages for workers. All along, Grau-San Martin's administration, now coming to its end, had remained on the watch, protecting the rights of the Cuban people as well as Cuba's national sovereignty.

Successive achievements of the "Authentic" administration were made viable by the free, indisputable election of Carlos Prío Socarrás as next President (1948-1952). His promulgation of a much-awaited legislative program to supplement the Constitution opened up an avenue for the establishment of an institutionalized state. This was accomplished through the founding of such institutions as the National Bank of Cuba; a National Bank for the Promotion of Agriculture and Industry (BANFAI); a Court for Constitutional Guarantees; a State, Provincial, and Municipal Accounting Law, and an Accounting Court Law. Enactment of the latter would virtually and eventually eliminate the possibility of administrative corruption.

The process of Cuba's economic development, along with its political and social advancements initiated earlier under Grau-San Martin, reached its climax during President Prío Socarras's administration. As an executive who honored the Constitution and the Law, Prío Socarrás caused no Cuban individuals of groups to flee into exile because of their political ideologies or beliefs. Prío Socarrás deservedly went down in history as Cuba's "Cordial President".

As President of all Cubans, Prío Socarrás consistently acted in defense of the best interests of the Cuban people and of Cuba's national sovereignty. In fact, his international policy was inspired by his personal loyalty to Cuba's independence and was guided by both his amicable relations with democratic neighbors and his special good will towards United States democracy.

It should be added, however, that Prío Socarras’s friendly attitude did not inhibit him from protecting Cuban industry, commerce, and national products at the tariff conferences held in Torquay, England and Annecy, France. Yet his strict observance of the impartiality of the Law in evaluating requisitions from foreign business franchisers operating in Cuba and his preference for Cuban national Banks in negotiating loans for the National Public Works Programs, caused tension and even friction between Cuba and the United States. This friction became aggravated when President Prio decided to turn down the United States demands. In the historical background, there were factors that paved the way for the later defamation of the "Authentic" Revolutionary Party while in power. Such factors included the administrative corruption prevailing through the Spanish colonial period, the American military occupation imposed on the newly founded Republic of Cuba, and the scandals in which some of the first Cuban administrations became involved. In addition, the Party's historical record was blemished by the deficient performance of certain venal government officials and by their obsolete administrative practices. Despite these setbacks, the "Authentic" administrations enforced whatever legal measures were available in an attempt to uproot existing evils and, above all, promulgated the long awaited laws to supplement the Cuban Constitution.

On November 15, 1948, President Prío Socarrás authorized and proclaimed an Anti-Gangster Law designed to avert political terrorism by prohibiting acts if physical violence as well as the illegal possession, use, and sale or firearms. Offenders of this law were promptly arrested and prosecuted, and the criminal courts imposed the applicable penalties according to the provisions of the Law.

The March 10 Coup D'Etat (1952)

A national presidential election had been scheduled for June 1, 1952, for which President Prío Socarras’s administration had pledged complete guarantees to all parties and candidates. Nonetheless, just eighty-two days before election day, Cuba's democratic expectations were again bluntly frustrated by a military coup d'etat. Behind the plot was once more Fulgencio Batista as head of a group of dishonest and greedy military officers who then took over the government by violence with the complicity of a few unscrupulous civilians. Their commandeering, of course, was in itself a gross insubordination, in flagrant violation of the Cuban Constitution.

Two unwanted circumstances aggravated the already unpleasant coup d'etat event: (1) the presence at Camp Columbia, the conspiracy center, of U.S. military advisors to Habana, in full uniform, while Batista was perpetrating his blatant act of high treason, and (2) the prompt recognition, 17 days after the military coup of Batista's new regime by the U.S. before it was completely established. These circumstances revived serious misgivings about the comportment of Washington, D.C. in its relations with Cuba and in its pursuit of a "Good Neighbor Policy". Furthermore, questions were raised about the extent to which the U.S. government might have been an accessory to the plot.

A new military dictatorship had cast a menacing shadow over Cuba's horizon. In the third era of his manipulation of Cuban politics, Batista followed up his former scheme by yielding to Washington, D.C. while using an iron fist against the Cuban people. He pushed Cuba back under absolute military control, established a state of siege throughout the Island, encouraged violence, torture, and murder at the hands of his political "thugs", wielded intimidation and coercion over the citizenry, submitted himself to foreign interfering interests, favored unrestrained administrative corruption, dealt with international crime organizations, wrecked constitutional and lawful institutions, and ended up by mocking national elections.

Eventually, Batista's downfall became inevitable once his possibilities were exhausted for catering to his ring of domestic and foreign patrons, who had been operating in collusion with a Cuban plutocracy. Those clients of his who in the "good old days" had carried him to power, now abandoned him, and a drastic change in government was imminent. During this last year in power, intensified assaults were made on the democratic forces who in the 1930's had initiated a struggle against militarism and American intervention, and who in the 1940's had shown that Cuba could flourish under the rule of law and order, in prosperity, and with social justice for all. Those others who had selfishly and treacherously supported militarism and had conspired to wreck Cuban democracy now simply closed the door in the defenders of Cuba's best interests.

Then came 1953, with an attack on the Moncada Barracks, 600 miles away from Habana, which should have changed the direction of Cuban politics. The operation had been conceived, planned, and directed by a mediocre student gang militant who, besides, had a criminal record, namely Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz.

The Cuban Popular Socialist Party (communist) immediately realized the time was "ripe" to try a master "pincers strategy" that would "work in opposition" at any cost. The scheme was to lead the communists to victory, regardless of who would be the winner in the struggle between Batista and the rebels. Thus, while the Party maintained its congenial relations with Batista and "officially" condemned then Moncada attack as a "putsch" proper for revolutionary adventurers, the Party high-ranking executives secretly sent one of them, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, to confer with Castro at his headquarters in the Oriente Province mountains. Coincidentally, such prestigious American publications as Times Magazine and The New York Times decided to project an attractive international image of Fidel Castro by portraying him as a revived "Robin Hood", thus laying the basis for the myth of "Castro, the Winning Warrior".

Synchronized with the discrediting propaganda launched by Batista in defiance of his democratic opponents, his alarmed political "buddies" began a search for a substitute, although to no avail. Batista's procedures, typical of his previous holdings of power, finally led to his confrontation with a popular armed revolution against his tyranny.

By 1958 it had become obviously impossible for Batista to maintain himself in power, so his "cronies" set in motion their plan to find the substitute. They guaranteed the tyrant a dignified way out for himself, a safe residence in exile, and security for both his family and his wealth, with no regard for illegal origin of the latter. As is known, these "kingmakers" were also paving the way for Fidel Castro's ascent to power as an expected liberator, backed up by the Cuban people in general and, especially, by the U.S. Department of State and the news media.

It is noteworthy that the "kingmakers" who executed this plan incurred a basic error by blocking the path for emerging democratic and progressive forces inside Cuba and by helping, instead, to raise up a new "strong man". Their error was exactly the same one previous interventionists had made in 1898, 1934, and 1952, only this time their attempts to use a "strong man" in Cuba ended up in total failure. The "strong man's" absolute control over the Island was consolidated after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, which gave him solid grounds to announce his new long-lasting myth "The invincible Revolution".

Unfortunately, after many years, Cuba's gloomy horizon still does not show signs of clearing up. Its temporary "dark age" must come to an end in due time but apparently not in the near future. In fact, the present complex and disastrous situation has become quite baffling, to the point that finding and implementing new plans for a possible solution has proven difficult for the Cuban people and for successive American administrations since 1962.

In Cuba, through the suppression of all civil liberties and the violation of all human rights, Castro's state-controlled, one-party regime has maintained an immobilizing strong grip over the Cuban people for thirty-five long years. It would seem only common sense, then, that this insane megalomaniac farce should be liquidated within reasonable time.

Precisely, this is the hour when we in the O/A wish to define our position regarding the Cuban issue. We must, and do, admit that in order to achieve a new and definitive liberation for Cuba the assistance and support of the American people and government have extraordinary value. Consequently, we will highlight the following pertinent facts:

Failures of Old Formulas

Ever since 1960, United States government officials have attempted to control and direct spontaneous anti-Castro movements, both inside Cuba and among Cubans in exile. The Bay of Pigs plan - poorly organized, worse directed, and finally abandoned with the freedom fighters on the battlefield - caused at least a temporary disorganization of the resistance ranks. Some men were killed or imprisoned in Cuba, others were persecuted, jailed or excluded outside Cuba while many were subjected to the temptation of stipends, favors, or other kinds of quasi-official recognition in exile. This situation deprived the anti-Castro underground of valuable and recognized leaders. The fact that these attempts at controlling and manipulating generated two impressive political arrays of Cuban exiles in the form of a manageable trend, on the one hand, and a significant segment, on the other. So, let us analyze each array briefly.

a) The manageable trend is mixed and comprises exiles who handle multiple personal agendas, with an interest in the business of government but with no native ideology. These individuals are characterized by their conformist attitude to decisions made in Washington, D.C. They are dispersed through many different groups - human rights, economic or cultural studies, presumed revolutionary activists, informants on exiles' internal affairs, and political dissidents from Castroism who are now striving for better opportunities in exile. Each organization's rank is determined by the extent to which the organization receives official and financial support, as well as by its relative importance in local politics. The trend, therefore includes opportunists, collaborators, annexationists, and professional anti-communist combatants. The majority of these kindred groups and personalities have no roots back on the island and are generally unaware of Cuba's historical processes. They are quite manageable and from time to time even costly. Their interest in the Cuban struggle has been aroused here in exile, and here it will die out.

b) The significant segment represents a unified and independent front, with an active Cuban ideology and with a program fir a return to Cuba's democratic and progressive development. This segment of the Cuban exiles cherishes ideals deeply rooted in Cuba, with a potential for guiding its fellow countrymen and women into a rediscovery of their historical destiny, from which Castroism led them astray. This segment, which neither procures nor seeks official support, aid, or perquisites from the United States government. This segment, which includes the O/A ("Authentic Organization" of the Cuban Revolutionary Party), is resolute in its decision to maintain uncompromising goals centered only on Cuba's future welfare and independence.

The rest of the Cubans now living in exile may be regarded not so much as émigrés but as immigrants who have other characteristics that fall outside the scope of this analysis.

The O/A Position

Our O/A ("Authentic Organization") adheres to its own call for democracy and civil rights in Cuba, and restates that in the past the Cuban "Authentic" administrations consistently supported the Non-Intervention Doctrine at the VII Pan American Conference in Montevideo (1933), urged the approval of the Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro (1947), and advocated the Doctrine of No-Economic Aggression at the VII Pan American Conference in Bogotá (1948). In addition, the delegates of the "Authentic" administrations at the Conferences in San Francisco and Chapultepec pleaded for the inclusion of Human Rights in the charters of both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Organization (UNO). Today, our O/A sincerely deplores the unfair selective application made of such principles in certain countries subjected to the lingering effects of the "Cold War" and to the special interests of the Great Powers.

As for the kind of regime imposed on Cuba by Fidel Castro, who has repeatedly violated international law and has robbed the Cuban people of their fundamental rights and their national fiscal reserves, the O/A proclaims its support for those steps that may be conducive to his political confinement and eventually the liquidation of his tyranny. The O/A likewise supports specific economic restrictions, the Torricelli Act included, intended to divest the tyrant of resources that would prolong his stay in power. Nonetheless, the O/A must emphatically take exception to those other provisions of the Torricelli Act that could arbitrarily interfere with the Cuban people's right to guide their own destiny towards freedom and would thus attempt to revive an ominous and obsolete "Plattism".

Ever since the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the 1962 October crisis, both of which took place during the Kennedy administration, the United States government has dealt with the Cuban problem in a manner that exemplifies ambiguity and political exploitation of the Cuban exiles. To mention just two examples: (1) the Russian-American confrontation on Cuba's posed nuclear threat as a Soviet military base concluded with a guarantee (Kennedy-Khrushchev’s Pact) that the United States government would neither commit nor permit aggressions against the Castro regime, even though this agreement defied both geopolitics and logicity; (2) the embargo imposed on Cuba in 1963 has been practically ignored. If to this one adds instances of contacts and reciprocal concessions between Washington, D.C. and Habana, then one would be faced with a case of circumvention of the basic principles of political ethics.

Apparently, after thirty-five long years, the American government has not yet been able to deal directly with its past and present policy failures in Cuba. Meantime, the Cuban people's suffering has been unnecessarily prolonged and, the worse for the United States, Cuban "anti-American feelings", exacerbated by Castro from the beginning of his revolution, now seem somehow justified by history.

Although the American failures in question have been analyzed in several published studies, we must again refer to an initial United States policy for acquiring Cuba from Spain (1805-1854), followed by the American military intervention in the Spanish-Cuban-American War (1895-1898), the American separate negotiations for peace with Spain through the Treaty of Paris (1898), the American military occupation of the Island (1898-1902), the American unilateral Platt Amendment on the organic law of the new Republic of Cuba (1902-34), along with several subsequent acts of imposition by the United States on different Cuban administrations. This meddling in Cuba's internal affairs culminated in Batista's military coup (1952) and led to his ensuing dictatorship (1952-1958), supported by Washington D.C. through its first five years (1952-1957).

A Possible Solution

It is simply unbelievable that the United States, a champion of democracy that for many years knew how to deal with the Soviet masters of "disinformation", might now be willing to accept without reserve that "the only solution" to avoid a blood bath in Cuba could be a dialogue and negotiation with Fidel Castro, under his absolute exercise of political and military power.

The O/A ("Authentic Organization") and its democratic allies have consistently viewed the perspective of the Cuban-American conflict, not as a competition between hegemonic interests (in Castro's terms) or necessarily as a status of violent struggle. Instead, the O/A sees the issue as the result of Castro's undeclared but actual war of attrition on his own people, who obviously have been fleeing from the his despotic and brutal tyrannical regime through several decades.

It should be crystal clear to objective observers that Fidel Castro is not the people of Cuba, nor is he the Cuban nation, least of all could he be any longer the leader of the famous revolution that succeeded in overthrowing Batista and his accessories in 1959. At that time, the Cuban people supported a revolution in the hope that it would be the way to achieve a renewed national status, with freedom and democracy. As is now known, before the eyes of the world Castro has used "his revolution" as a smoke screen to cover up for his outrages and insatiable craving for personal power and wealth.

Our Rationale

At this momentous point in history, Cuba requires profound social, political, and economic changes that are impossible to develop with Castro in power. Of course, we Cubans, both outside and inside Cuba, must be ready to pay the price of sacrifice and bloodshed if necessary for the conquest of our country's liberty. Cubans want to return to the international community as an independent and sovereign state, not as Castro's or anyone else's pawn in the world chessboard game of Great Powers.

If the government of the United States is indeed willing to adopt a realistic attitude towards the Cuban people and their most tragic problem in history, then the US government will appreciate the valid, sound aspirations of the Cubans to live in freedom, enjoy national sovereignty, and join the rest of the world in sharing progress, prosperity, and the pursuit of happiness.

A basic consideration is that both Americans and Cubans must be willing to recognize that Cuba possesses its own human resources to transform Castro's totalitarian state into a democratic nation, to resume its historical course, to heal its sickened society, to help itself out of its present castaway condition, and to march towards an effective comeback into the global community of civilized nations.

All of us must, above all, realize that the Cuban conflict is a struggle between, on one side, freedom loving, mutually friendly Cubans against an implacable oligarchy, on the other side, headed by an unlawful, despotic impostor who poses as a legitimate ruler, but who does not even have a healthy mind.

Based on this rationale, the O/A ("Authentic Organization") sees but one way conducive to the liquidation of communist barbarism in Cuba: To let the Cubans in and outside the Island freely decide on a solution to their problem and fight for it.

Modern history has shown that for Cuba the 20th century is approaching its end just as it began, that is, with a Spanish-American consortium attempting to set preconceived plans for Cuba's future, overlooking the Cuban people's right to choose, pursue, and conquer its own destiny. This is not and could never be a plausible, fair solution for Cuba. An extraneous formula imposed on Cuba again will never be a definitive solution to the serious Cuban problem. Instead, it will bring about bitter resentment and serious political consequences.

Our Final Plea

Cubans do need assistance from the United States, but that assistance will not include US soldiers' involvement in bloodshed or sacrifice. All Cuba needs at this historical crossroad is the kind of lawful material and political assistance that both the Federal Government and the American people have already given other peoples in their legitimate struggle for national freedom.

Throughout its political history, the United States adopted certain erroneous decisions regarding Cuba that seriously hurt the feelings of the Cuban people. Those decisions belied the moral authority and international prestige of the United States, and those decisions must be corrected. Historical circumstances should allow the government of the United States, to facilitate viable changes and to demonstrate the spiritual sensibility of this great nation. The goal could be achieved by simply offsetting any traces of the old politics of intervention, inept meddling and unnecessary shows of superior military power, all of which generated anti-imperialist feelings among the Cuban people in the past.

Today the Cubans on the Island are definitely suffering, both materially and spiritually, due to Fidel Castro's brutal obsession with power. Their distress has been aggravated by either the indifference or the complicity of some national governments that have chosen to play along with the tyrant. Moreover, desperation among Cubans has been worsened by the observance of international legal and ethical principles that should shape the life of civilized nations.

The resolution that may be adopted to help expedite the return of Cuba to national democratic life in the world community will certainly represent a policy of good will and hope for all free nations of the Americas.

Finally, the O/A sincerely trusts that at a sometime in the future all free men and women throughout our Western Hemisphere will be compassionate enough to realize the severe hardships the Cubans had to sustain on their long road to either "liberation or crucifixion". The O/A further trusts that the United States, as a leading world power for freedom and democracy, will encourage and assist our people in bringing about our political liberation, instead of our useless crucifixion.

Miami, Florida May 20, 1994, on the 92nd Anniversary of Cuba's first republican government.

For the O/A Executive Committee

Lomberto Díaz, President

José Adán
José Colmenares
Miguel Echegarrua
Luis Fernandez
Rodolfo Leon
Norberto Martinez
Angel M. Perez
José Rodriguez
Rene Santos
Miguel Uría

Cuba, España y los Estados Unidos | Organización Auténtica | Política Exterior de la O/A | Temas Auténticos | Líderes Auténticos | Figuras del Autenticismo | Símbolos de la Patria | Nuestros Próceres | Martirologio |

Presidio Político de Cuba Comunista | Costumbres Comunistas | Temática Cubana | Brigada 2506 | La Iglesia | Cuba y el Terrorismo | Cuba - Inteligencia y Espionaje | Cuba y Venezuela | Clandestinidad | United States Politics | Honduras vs. Marxismo | Bibliografía | Puentes Electrónicos |

Organización Auténtica